Discrediting Democracy: What Belarusian State Media Got Wrong About Romania’s Elections

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It unexpectedly turned out that Belarusian media with state ownership began writing and commenting on the second round of presidential elections in Romania even after they ended.

Research Methodology
Analysis Period
May 1-25, 2025
Sources
NEWS.BY, CTVBY, ONT TV, SBTV
Materials
24 videos
Method
FIMI/DIMI framework

Main Research Results
76 disinformation narratives

Identified systematic use of manipulative techniques

High risk level

Average manipulative intensity: 7.8/10

Coordinated campaign

Signs of FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation)

2290 mentions of key terms

Dominance of negative vocabulary and geopolitical concepts

Types of disinformation narratives
37% Manipulation
Characteristics: Use of emotionally charged language, selective quoting, distortion of context to create a negative image of Romanian elections.
Examples: “electoral circus”, “cancellation of unwanted candidates”, “dead souls in voter lists”
28% Conspiracy theories
Characteristics: Promotion of unfounded theories about external control, manipulations and hidden forces controlling Romanian politics.
Examples: French intelligence interference, Telegram censorship, globalist conspiracies
23% Polarization
Characteristics: Artificial division of Romanian society, creation of false dichotomies between “people” and “system”.
Examples: “True Romanians against Brussels puppets”
12% DiscreditationCharacteristics: Personal attacks on candidates, unfounded accusations of corruption and fraud.Examples: Personal attacks on Dan, Simeon, European politicians

Key terms analysis
Distribution of terms by categories shows dominance of Romanian themes (741 mentions) and significant role of negative terms (487 mentions)
741
Romanian realities
487
Negative terms
476
Geopolitical
323
Emotional
263
Moldova/Ukraine

Word cloud of key terms demonstrates the central role of concepts “elections”, “Romania”, “interference” and “falsification”

Conceptual connections in narratives
Network diagram shows persistent connections between Romania, elections, falsification and external actors

Key actors analysis

Frequency of mentions of various political figures shows focus on Romanian politicians and external actors

Chronology of disinformation campaign
May 3-5: Campaign launch

Launch of narrative about “electoral circus” and “cancellation of unwanted candidates”. Focus on external control.
Medium risk

May 11-16: Escalation

Intensification of conspiracy theories, accusations of mass falsifications, discreditation of European institutions.
High risk

May 18-19: Election day

Mass claims about violations, “US interference”, voter bribery, ballot manipulations.
Critical risk

May 20-25: After elections

Interpretation of results as “systemic crisis”, predictions of “radicalization” of Romanian society.
Medium risk

Chart shows peak intensity of all types of disinformation narratives on the day of the second round of elections

Emotional tone of content became increasingly negative, reaching minimum on the day of the second round of elections

Key factual distortions
Distortion #1: “Mass violations in elections”
Claim: “More than 4 million deceased citizens recorded in voter lists”
Fact: Romania’s Central Electoral Commission did not confirm violations of the claimed scale. Regular voter registry cleaning procedures are conducted routinely.
Distortion #2: “French intelligence interference”
Claim: “French intelligence demanded blocking conservative channels on Telegram”
Fact: Claims are based exclusively on Pavel Durov’s statements without providing documentary evidence or official denials.
Distortion #3: “Romania loses sovereignty”
Claim: “Romania is a puppet of Brussels and Washington”
Fact: Romania conducts independent foreign and domestic policy within its international obligations as an EU and NATO member.

Unique features of Romanian election coverage:
  • Narrative of “dead souls” (fake voter registrations)
  • Accusations of French intelligence interference
  • Claims of Telegram censorship
  • Manipulations with Moldovan diaspora
  • Constitutional Court scandal
  • Protests with passport destruction

Conclusions and recommendations
Main conclusions:

  • Identified coordinated campaign to discredit Romanian electoral process

  • Systematic use of FIMI techniques (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference)

  • Dominance of manipulative techniques (37% of all narratives)

  • Significant role of conspiracy theories (28% of narratives)

  • Persistent connection between concepts “Romania”, “falsification”, and “external forces”

Recommendations for countering:


  • Development of media literacy and training in recognizing manipulative techniques

  • Prompt fact-checking of claims about “external interference”

  • Analysis of the Moldovan factor in regional context

  • Monitoring narratives about European integration

  • Study of social platform policy impact

  • Development of countermeasures against emotional manipulations

FIMI/DIMI indicators
Identified signs correspond to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference criteria:
  • Coordinated distribution through state media
  • Use of manipulative techniques in 37% of content
  • Targeted discreditation of democratic processes
  • Promotion of polarizing narratives in 23% of materials
  • Systematic nature of campaign over 3 weeks


Distribution of manipulative techniques

27%
Emotional exploitation
25%
Selective quoting
18%
Conspiracy theories
15%
Concept substitution
12%
False dichotomies
8%
Discreditation

Conclusion: This analysis revealed systematic use of disinformation techniques by Belarusian state media to discredit democratic processes in Romania. The high intensity of manipulativeness (7.8/10) and coordinated nature of the campaign indicate the need to strengthen measures to counter information manipulation.
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