Belarusian Civil Society and Disinformation, July 2024

After a long period, it became possible to return to monitoring disinformation about the Belarusian civil society. In the new publications, we will use an updated methodology.

We will use the DISARM (Disinformation Analysis and Resilience Mechanisms) methodology to classify the collected publications. DISARM proposes the following stages of analysis:

• Detect: Identifying which publications might potentially contain disinformation. This can be done by using key indicators of disinformation, such as the presence of false statements, distortion of facts, and the use of aggressive or manipulative language.
• Identify: Identifying the sources of these publications (state media, pro-government media, independent sources, etc.).
• Analyze: Conducting content analysis of the publications to identify narratives directed against civil society. Determining which topics and arguments are used to discredit NGOs and promote GONGOs.
• Respond: At this stage, strategies can be proposed to respond to disinformation campaigns. This may include creating counter-narratives, informing the public, etc.
• Measure: Measuring the effectiveness of disinformation dissemination (mention frequency, audience reach, engagement, etc.).

Methodology
A dataset was collected using tools such as Oxylabs Web Scraper API. In July, 1019 messages were collected from 74 sources and 495 authors. Data cleaning was then performed, and a final dataset of 255 records was formed. The distribution throughout the month:

Then, using the models gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18 and gpt-4o-2024-08-06, a DISARM analysis was conducted.

Let’s consider some of the results obtained.
At the beginning of July, Sputnik Belarus organized a master class by Kirill Vyshinsky, Executive Director of the Rossiya Segodnya media group, a member of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights of the Russian Federation.

Kirill Vyshinsky stated the following:

“This allows for quick editing, cutting, releasing, and being the first… This is a very important story that became clear in the early 2000s, and it is, by the way, what the internet has brought… Sometimes it’s important not to be the most accurate, but to be the first,” Vyshinsky noted.

Evaluating the entire publication: in terms of disinformation narratives:

1. Disinformation: The text mentions that “sometimes it’s important not to be the most accurate, but to be the first.” This statement may contribute to the spread of disinformation as it emphasizes the priority of speed over accuracy, potentially leading to situations where the media publishes inaccurate information, contradicting the core principles of journalism.
2. Distortion: Vyshinsky talks about how clickable headlines (clickbait) can be beneficial from a marketing perspective, even if the information is inaccurate. This may create a distorted perception that journalism can function without accountability for information accuracy.
3. Hidden Motives: The text focuses on the use of technology and marketing in journalism, which may imply that the goal of the media is not only to inform but also to profit by manipulating audience attention. This can lead to distrust in the media and undermine their reputation.
4. Reductionism: The statement that “journalism is becoming an increasingly responsible profession” can be perceived as an oversimplification of the complex issue related to the ethics and practice of journalism. The responsibility of journalists cannot be reduced to a simple comparison of speed and accuracy.
5. Manipulation: Emphasizing the importance of clickbait headlines can be perceived as manipulation, as it may encourage journalists and editors to ignore factual accuracy in favor of attracting attention.

Sputnik Belarus produced about ten materials dedicated to the master class, all of which contain signs of disinformation narratives, including the topic of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine.

On July 10, 2024, it was thirty years since the last free, internationally recognized elections were held in Belarus.
As expected, a huge number of publications were devoted to forming a “cult of personality” around the current leader of the country.
An example publication:

The text contains several disinformation narratives that can be analyzed using DISARM:

1. Disinformation: The text presents a one-sided view of events related to the introduction of the presidency in Belarus, emphasizing the positive aspects and ignoring the negative consequences, such as the suppression of the opposition, human rights violations, and the lack of democratic elections. This creates a distorted view of the real situation in the country.
2. Selectivity: The text only presents the opinions of experts and state officials who support the existing power structure, without mentioning alternative viewpoints or criticisms. This creates the impression of unanimity in society, although in reality, there is a wide range of opinions.
3. Agitation: The text actively supports the figure of Alexander Lukashenko, portraying him as the savior of the country and the people. Emotionally charged expressions, such as “lifeline” and “guarantee of stability,” are used, which can create positive associations in the reader.
4. Rhetoric: Rhetorical techniques are used, such as assertions of “popular support” and the “historical inevitability” of introducing the presidency. This creates the illusion that the decision was the only correct and justified one, which does not correspond to reality.
5. Myths: The text creates myths about the “strong power” that allegedly saved the country from chaos and poverty. This simplifies complex socio-economic issues and ignores other factors that may have influenced the situation in Belarus in the 1990s.

Overall, the text clearly demonstrates signs of disinformation aimed at supporting the existing regime and its leader, while ignoring criticism and alternative opinions.

In the publications dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the presidency, there was a contrast between the Belarusian civil society and how “civil society” is currently formulated. A quote from SB.BY: Belarus Today:

Political analyst and expert of the IPA CIS Oleg Leshenyuk believes that the introduction of the presidency allowed Belarus to implement the principle of separation of powers, to form an effective system of state governance with national, ethnic, and socio-historical features:
— The young independent country created its own statehood, went through a colossal evolution. This allowed it to independently build political and economic relations, create a civil society without ‘assistance’ from the outside, engage in large-scale interstate integration projects, and much more.

Publications by “Russian Houses” in Belarus are particularly concerning.

It is noteworthy that the DISARM framework used in the analysis did not detect disinformation narratives in these publications. The analysis seems more like an assessment of an event dedicated to historical memory and patriotic education.
Using the DISARM approach, the following was identified:

1. D – Disinformation: The text does not contain explicit disinformation, but the emphasis on preserving “historical truth” may imply that there is an alternative version of events that the author considers false. This could be a sign that the text is attempting to promote a specific narrative about the events of the Great Patriotic War.
2. I – Intention: The text’s intention may be related to strengthening patriotic feelings and supporting a certain political agenda. Mentioning “spiritual-patriotic, cultural values” and “expanding partnership cooperation” may indicate an attempt to legitimize the actions of Russia and Belarus in the context of historical memory.
3. S – Source: The text refers to official organizations such as the Russian Peace Foundation and the Russian House, which may give it a certain degree of legitimacy. However, the lack of independent sources of information about the event may raise questions about its objectivity.
4. A – Audience: The text is targeted at an audience interested in patriotic education and the preservation of historical memory. This could be both the local population and a broader audience interested in Russian-Belarusian relations.
5. R – Response: The response to the text may vary. For supporters of patriotic education and historical memory, it may be perceived positively, while critics may see it as an attempt to manipulate history and political propaganda.

Overall, the text does not contain explicit disinformation elements, but its emphasis and intentions can be used to promote a certain narrative related to historical memory and patriotism.

One of the most aggressive examples of disinformation is regularly demonstrated by the permanent author of “SB: Belarus Today” – Andrey Mukovozchik. In July, his “text” was titled: We need to remain vigilant simply because all the incredible people — they lived next to us. For a long time, they lived
(this time without caricatures in the Soviet-propaganda style of Kukryniksy):

The text contains several disinformation narratives that can be classified using the DISARM framework (Doubt, Innuendo, Stereotypes, Absurdities, Repetition, and Misleading information).

1. Doubt: The text raises doubts about the legitimacy and motives of the people mentioned, such as Anzhelika Melnikova and Ksyusha Malyukova. The author labels them as “extremists” and “terrorists,” creating a negative image and undermining trust in them without providing convincing evidence.
2. Innuendo: The text is full of insinuations linking people to criminal elements, such as “well-known criminals.” This creates associations that may be false or exaggerated but are aimed at creating a negative image.
3. Stereotypes: Stereotypes about women, especially feminists and activists, are used, portraying them as manipulators and selfish. This may contribute to further spreading negative stereotypes about women in public and political life.
4. Absurdities: Some statements, such as “the organizers were leading their sheep to prison,” sound absurd and may be perceived as exaggerations. This can distract from real issues and create a distorted picture of what is happening.
5. Repetition: Certain phrases and ideas are repeated in the text, such as “hormonal disruptions” and “selfish interests,” which may reinforce the impression that this is a common problem among all the mentioned people, despite the lack of evidence.
6. Misleading information: The text claims that the collected funds were used improperly, but does not provide sufficient evidence or context for these accusations. This can mislead the reader about the real situation.

The final example demonstrates the statements of three leading state propagandists: V. Gigin, G. Azarenok, O. Romanov, who are shaping the cult of personality around the current leader of the country:

The text contains several disinformation narratives that can be classified using the DISARM framework:

1. D – Dehumanization: The statements mention that “they tried to destroy us,” which may imply that opponents or adversaries are not fully human and can be subjected to violence. This creates the image of an enemy, which may justify aggressive actions.
2. I – Inversion: The words that “strength is in the truth, and the truth is on our side” represent an inversion of facts, as this statement can be used to justify actions that do not conform to generally accepted norms and standards. It also implies that any criticism or disagreement with the government is a lie.
3. S – Simplification: The text simplifies complex political and social phenomena, presenting them in a black-and-white manner, where one side (the government and its supporters) is good and right, while the other (the opposition and foreign influences) is bad and evil.
4. A – Alienation: Phrases such as “under the leadership of our Batka” create a sense of exclusivity and alienation from those who do not support the current regime, which can divide society into “us” and “them.”
5. R – Repetition: The repetition of ideas about “strength in truth” and “historical foundation” creates an effect that these ideas are true, even if they are not supported by evidence. This can contribute to the formation of persistent stereotypes and opinions.

Overall, the text uses patriotic and emotionally charged narratives to strengthen support for the current government and discredit opposition forces, which is characteristic of disinformation materials.

Based on the results of July 2024, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The Belarusian authorities are meticulously continuing to construct the format of the “correct” Belarusian civil society, which is part of the current system of state governance in Belarus.
2. Disinformation narratives are used to discredit “civil society,” which falls under the definition of the third sector and has been subject to varying degrees of repression for almost all thirty years of the presidency in Belarus.
3. The DISARM approach allows for a qualitative analysis of almost all media texts that tend to use disinformation narratives about civil society. The labeling of publications requires further refinement of the mathematical models used.