Disinformation represents one of the most serious threats to information security in modern society, undermining public trust and distorting the information space.
This research presents a comprehensive analysis of the structure, dynamics, and interconnections of disinformation narratives based on data from January-Febraury 2025. Special attention is given to the presidential elections in Belarus on January 26, 2025, as a critical political event around which an intensification of disinformation activity was observed.
Understanding the disinformation ecosystem requires multidimensional analysis, including studying the prevalence of various narratives, their interconnections, manipulation techniques used, and dynamics of changes during important political events. This analysis has not only scientific but also practical value for developing effective strategies to counter disinformation and enhance media literacy in society.
Methodology
The research is based on the analysis of 2,840 materials published on five YouTube channels of Belarusian state-owned media (ONT, NEWS.BY, BelTA, CTVBY, SB TV) from January 1 to March 1, 2025. Each material was analyzed using various LLM models (for data collection, transcription, analysis of disinformation narratives, semantic analysis) and expert assessment to identify:
- Present disinformation narratives
- Manipulation techniques used
- Risk level (high, medium, low)
- Level of confidence in presenting narratives
For temporal analysis, special attention was paid to the periods:
- Week before the elections (January 19-25)
- Election day (January 26)
- Week after the elections (January 27 – February 2)
Dominant Narratives and Their Prevalence
The analysis revealed a clear predominance of three main types of narratives in the disinformation space: anti-elitism (1,403 mentions), global conspiracy (1,095 mentions), and dehumanization (1,051 mentions). These narratives significantly exceed all other categories in frequency, forming the foundation of the disinformation ecosystem.
They are followed by more specialized narratives with much lower frequency: anti-Western narrative (293), fostering distrust (182), and anti-Americanism (141). This structure indicates the presence of a core of dominant narratives and a periphery of more narrowly targeted narratives that may be activated depending on the specific context.
It is interesting to note that among the identified narratives, there are both negative (aimed at undermining trust in existing institutions) and positive ones (for example, positive image of Belarus, positive image of authorities). However, positive narratives are much less common and constitute less than 5% of the total volume of analyzed materials.
Definitions of key disinformation narratives
Anti-elitism is a narrative that seeks to undermine trust in political, intellectual, economic, or social elites by portraying them as corrupt, alienated from ordinary people, or acting in their narrow interests. This narrative often contrasts “ordinary people” with “arrogant elites,” claiming that existing institutions and their leaders do not represent the interests of the majority. In the disinformation context, anti-elitism is used to undermine trust in expert knowledge, scientific institutions, government organizations, and traditional media.Global conspiracy is a narrative asserting the existence of secret international groups that coordinate their actions to achieve hidden goals of world domination or control. Such theories typically assume that powerful organizations or individuals (international financial groups, government agencies, technology corporations, etc.) manipulate global events, economies, politics, and public opinion. In the context of disinformation, this narrative is used to explain complex problems with simplified cause-and-effect relationships and to create an image of an invisible enemy that must be fought against.
Dehumanization is a narrative aimed at depriving certain groups of people or individuals of human qualities, portraying them as “others,” “aliens,” or even “non-humans.” This process includes the use of language and images that compare people to animals, insects, diseases, or represent them as machines devoid of emotions and morality. In the context of disinformation, dehumanization serves to justify negative attitudes, discrimination, or violence against certain groups, creating a moral distance between “us” and “them,” which facilitates the acceptance of aggressive policies and actions against dehumanized groups.
All three narratives often interact with and reinforce each other in disinformation campaigns, creating a holistic worldview where certain groups are portrayed as hostile, less human, and participating in secret conspiracies against ordinary people.
Temporal dynamics graph of the three main narratives: anti-elitism, global conspiracy, and dehumanization
The temporal analysis of disinformation activity revealed a clear connection with the political calendar. The presented graph demonstrates the dynamics of the three dominant narratives (anti-elitism, global conspiracy, and dehumanization) during a two-month period – from late December 2024 to early March 2025.
The key point of intensification was the day of the presidential elections in Belarus on January 26, 2025, when a striking peak in the spread of all three main narratives was observed. Anti-elitism reached a maximum of 55 mentions that day, which is approximately twice the average value for the entire study period. Global conspiracy and dehumanization also showed a synchronous surge, reaching 32 and 48 mentions respectively.
The graph allows identifying a three-phase nature of the disinformation campaign:
- Preparatory phase (early January – January 25): A gradual increase in the intensity of all three narratives is observed, with local peaks on January 19 and 23 (a week and three days before the elections). This period is characterized by creating an information background and preparing the audience.
- Peak intensity (January 26): Election day is marked by a sharp, almost twofold increase in the number of all three narratives, indicating a coordinated intensification of disinformation activity.
- Post-electoral phase (January 27 – late February): After some decline in activity in early February, secondary peaks are observed in mid-month (around February 17) and at the end of February, indicating the continuation of the disinformation campaign after the completion of the elections.
It is important to note the synchronicity of patterns across all three narratives throughout the period. Coordinated surges and declines indicate their strategic complementary use within a unified information campaign. Anti-elitism consistently dominates in the number of mentions, except for a few short periods when global conspiracy or dehumanization temporarily come to the fore.
There is also a general trend towards an increase in the average level of activity in the second half of February compared to early January, which may indicate a long-term effect of the election campaign on the intensity of disinformation.
Such a clear correlation between the political calendar and the intensity of disinformation narratives confirms the purposeful nature of their use and the need to pay special attention to monitoring the information space not only on the day of critical political events but also for several weeks before and after them.
Distribution of Materials by Main Narratives and Risk Level
The color of the columns reflects the percentage of high risk (from red/high to green/low). The anti-Western narrative has the most intense red color, indicating the highest percentage of risk. Fostering distrust and anti-Americanism also show a high level of risk. National pride and state support have a green shade, indicating a low percentage of risk.
The most common narratives (anti-elitism, global conspiracy, dehumanization) have a medium risk level (yellow-orange color). The anti-Western narrative, although less common, has the highest risk level.
Some rare narratives, such as dehumanization of the opposition, are also associated with high risk.
The graph effectively demonstrates that the most common narratives do not always pose the greatest risk. The most dangerous in terms of a high percentage of risk are specific narratives directed against the West and aimed at fostering distrust, although they are not the most numerous in the general flow of disinformation.
Connection Between Narratives and Risk Level
The analysis of the relationship between narrative types and risk levels made it possible to identify three categories of narratives according to the degree of potential danger
High-risk narratives (more than 60% of materials with high risk level):
- Dehumanization of the opposition (77.1%)
- Anti-Western narrative (66.6%)
- Dehumanization of opponents (63.0%)
- Fostering distrust (61.5%)
Medium-risk narratives (30-60% of materials with high risk):
- Anti-Americanism (59.6%)
- Global conspiracy (55.6%)
- Dehumanization (47.0%)
- Anti-elitism (43.8%)
- Security threat (41.5%)
- Anti-elitist narrative (39.2%)
- Patriotism (31.7%)
- Positive image of Belarus (30.2%)
Low-risk narratives (less than 30% of materials with high risk):
- Positive image of authorities (21.2%)
- National pride (7.0%)
- State support (0.0%)
The presented graph clearly demonstrates the distribution of risk levels (high, medium, low) for each narrative. It is particularly noticeable that high-risk narratives contain almost no materials with a low level of risk, while low-risk narratives have a significant proportion of content with a low level of risk (21.1% for national pride and 27.3% for state support).
It is noteworthy that the three narratives dominant in prevalence (anti-elitism, global conspiracy, dehumanization) belong to the medium risk category, while some less common narratives (for example, dehumanization of the opposition) demonstrate the highest level of risk. This may indicate the strategic use of high-risk narratives in more targeted campaigns aimed at specific audiences or contexts.
Percentage of Materials with High Risk Level by Narratives
This graph represents a ranked distribution of narratives by the percentage of materials with a high risk level. It is especially useful for quickly identifying the most dangerous narratives. At the top of the ranking is the dehumanization of the opposition with 77.1% of high-risk materials, followed by the anti-Western narrative (66.6%), dehumanization of opponents (63.0%), and fostering distrust (61.5%).
This graph emphasizes the significant disparity in risk level between different narratives – from 77.1% of materials with high risk for the dehumanization of the opposition to a complete absence of such (0%) for the state support narrative.
It is important to note a clear gradation of narratives by risk level: narratives related to dehumanization and directed against specific groups demonstrate the highest level of risk; they are followed by conspiracy and anti-elitist narratives; the lowest level of risk is characteristic of positive and pro-government narratives.
This distribution confirms the hypothesis that narratives aimed at dividing society and dehumanizing opponents pose the greatest danger, while narratives emphasizing positive aspects pose a lesser threat.
Interconnections Between Narratives
The correlation analysis showed the presence of a pronounced structure of interconnections between different types of narratives. The most notable feature is the strong positive correlation between the three dominant narratives: anti-elitism, global conspiracy, and dehumanization (correlations 0.67-0.68). This indicates their systematic joint use within coordinated disinformation campaigns.
Notably, the anti-Western narrative demonstrates a negative correlation with the three main narratives (from -0.17 to -0.31), which suggests its use in other contexts, likely targeting a different audience. The narrative of fostering distrust shows a moderate positive correlation with anti-elitism (0.23) and global conspiracy (0.24), acting as a kind of connecting link.
Most other narratives demonstrate weak correlations among themselves, indicating their relative independence and specialized application. The absence of strong negative correlations (except for the anti-Western narrative) suggests that narratives are generally not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary or independent.
Multiplicity of Narratives in Disinformation Materials
Analysis of the number of narratives present in one material revealed a clear tendency to use several narratives simultaneously. The median value is 3 narratives per material, which also corresponds to the most frequent value (mode). Materials with three narratives constitute about 60% of the total number of analyzed sources.
Secondary peaks are observed for materials with two and four narratives (approximately 20% each). Materials with one narrative are extremely rare (less than 2%), which confirms the thesis about the complex, multi-layered nature of modern disinformation. Such a structure allows creating complex manipulative constructs that are more difficult to refute, since even when one narrative is debunked, others may maintain their impact.
This distribution also explains the high correlation between the three main narratives, as their combination forms the core of most disinformation materials.
Disinformation Techniques and Their Use
The study of techniques used to spread disinformation narratives identified four dominant techniques: concept substitution (3,065 cases), emotional provocation (2,944), rhetorical questions (2,714), and distortion of facts (2,688). These techniques significantly exceed all other manipulative tools in frequency and form the main tactical arsenal of disinformation.
Medium-frequency techniques include emotional coloring (1,067) and false conclusions (1,036), while techniques such as appeal to fear (626), dehumanization (600), and use of unverified data (477) are used less frequently but are still noticeable in the overall array.
It is interesting to note that among the identified techniques, there are cognitive-linguistic (concept substitution, rhetorical questions), emotional (emotional provocation, fear), and factual (distortion of facts, unverified data) manipulations, which indicates a comprehensive approach to influencing different aspects of information perception.
Connection Between Narratives and Risk Level
The analysis of the relationship between narrative types and risk levels made it possible to identify three categories of narratives according to the degree of potential danger
High-risk narratives (more than 60% of materials with high risk level):
- Dehumanization of the opposition (77.1%)
- Anti-Western narrative (66.6%)
- Dehumanization of opponents (63.0%)
- Fostering distrust (61.5%)
Medium-risk narratives (30-60% of materials with high risk):
- Anti-Americanism (59.6%)
- Global conspiracy (55.6%)
- Dehumanization (47.0%)
- Anti-elitism (43.8%)
- Security threat (41.5%)
- Anti-elitist narrative (39.2%)
- Patriotism (31.7%)
- Positive image of Belarus (30.2%)
Low-risk narratives (less than 30% of materials with high risk):
- Positive image of authorities (21.2%)
- National pride (7.0%)
- State support (0.0%)
It is noteworthy that the three narratives dominant in prevalence (anti-elitism, global conspiracy, dehumanization) belong to the medium risk category, while some less common narratives (for example, dehumanization of the opposition) demonstrate the highest level of risk. This may indicate the strategic use of high-risk narratives in more targeted campaigns aimed at specific audiences or contexts.
Connection Between Disinformation Techniques and Risk Level
The analysis of the relationship between disinformation techniques and risk levels revealed that for most techniques, a medium risk level prevails.
Nevertheless, some techniques demonstrate a higher proportion of materials with high risk:
- False conclusions (605 high / 430 medium)
- Distortion of facts (1088 high / 1552 medium)
- Concept substitution (1125 high / 1776 medium)
- Emotional provocation (1070 high / 1706 medium)
Techniques with the lowest proportion of high risk include dehumanization (330 high / 263 medium) and emotional coloring (466 high / 556 medium). It is interesting to note that the low-risk category constitutes an insignificant share for all techniques, which suggests that the use of manipulative techniques is rarely assessed as low-risk.
Tactical Toolkit of Narratives
Cross-analysis of narratives and disinformation techniques revealed unique “instrumental profiles” for each type of narrative.
The three dominant narratives demonstrate similar patterns of technique use:
Anti-elitism relies on:
- Concept substitution (1498)
- Emotional provocation (1445)
- Distortion of facts (1436)
- Rhetorical questions (1396)
Global conspiracy uses:
- Concept substitution (1182)
- Emotional provocation (1133)
- Distortion of facts (1155)
- Rhetorical questions (1084)
Dehumanization is implemented through:
- Concept substitution (1126)
- Emotional provocation (1082)
- Distortion of facts (1095)
- Rhetorical questions (1045)
The anti-Western narrative particularly relies on concept substitution (355) and emotional provocation (323), while fostering distrust more often uses concept substitution (204) and distortion of facts (203).
This structure confirms the existence of a “big four” of techniques (concept substitution, emotional provocation, distortion of facts, rhetorical questions) that form the basis of the tactical arsenal of disinformation regardless of the specific type of narrative.
Analysis of the Distribution of Confidence Levels in Narratives
The graph presents the distribution of confidence levels in disinformation narratives, which provides important information about the nature of the presentation of manipulative content.
Analysis of the level of confidence in disinformation narratives revealed an interesting and strategically significant pattern. The vast majority of materials demonstrate a moderately high level of confidence in the range of 70-79%, constituting 4,578 cases from the total data array. This indicates the prevalence of so-called “confident skepticism” – presenting information with sufficient conviction to inspire trust, but without excessive categoricalness that could provoke suspicion.
The second most common category is materials with a high but not absolute level of confidence (80-89%), counting 2,917 cases. Materials with a medium level of confidence (60-69%) are significantly less common – 955 cases, which indicates the lower effectiveness of cautious formulations in the disinformation context.
Particularly indicative is the extremely small number of materials with maximum confidence (90-100%) – only 157 cases, as well as the almost complete absence of content with a low level of confidence (less than 60%) – only 21 cases. This feature of the distribution demonstrates the tactical caution of disinformation creators, avoiding both absolute statements that are easier to refute and uncertain statements that may be ignored by the audience.
The identified distribution is consistent with modern psychological research on the persuasiveness of information.
The concentration of most materials in the range of moderately high confidence (70-89%) corresponds to data that such a level of conviction is perceived by the audience as the most credible, as it leaves less reason for skepticism and at the same time does not cause suspicion due to excessive categoricalness.
This pattern has an important relationship with the previously identified characteristics of the disinformation landscape. The predominance of moderately high confidence ideally combines with the most common manipulation techniques – concept substitution and emotional provocation, which are most effective precisely with such a degree of persuasiveness that does not cause immediate rejection.
The question of possible differentiation of confidence levels depending on the type of narrative deserves separate attention. Preliminary analysis suggests that high-risk narratives, such as dehumanization of the opposition and anti-Western rhetoric, may be characterized by a higher level of confidence compared to neutral narratives. Also of considerable interest is the analysis of the dynamics of confidence level in the period around critical political events, in particular, the presidential elections on January 26, 2025, when a strategic increase in the categoricalness of statements may have been observed.
Understanding the patterns of confidence in disinformation materials has significant practical importance for developing effective countermeasures. Identifying the characteristic range of confidence can serve as an additional indicator in identifying potential disinformation. Developing counter-narratives with an appropriate level of persuasiveness will more effectively neutralize manipulative influence. Educational programs teaching the audience to recognize manipulations with confidence level can increase the overall resilience of the information space to disinformation.
Such a distribution of confidence levels demonstrates a high degree of strategic sophistication in modern disinformation campaigns, where even such a parameter as confidence in statements is carefully calibrated for maximum impact on the target audience.
Conclusion
The comprehensive analysis of disinformation narratives allows making a number of key conclusions:
Modern disinformation represents a complex multi-layered construct based on the simultaneous use of several interconnected narratives. The core of this construct consists of three dominant narratives: anti-elitism, global conspiracy, and dehumanization, which demonstrate a high level of correlation and similar patterns of manipulative technique use.
The tactical arsenal of disinformation relies on the “big four” techniques: concept substitution, emotional provocation, distortion of facts, and rhetorical questions. These techniques constitute a universal toolkit for promoting various types of narratives.
Disinformation activity has a pronounced connection with the political calendar, demonstrating peaks of intensity during important political events, such as presidential elections. At the same time, disinformation is not limited to election day but represents a long-term campaign with preparatory and post-electoral phases.
The risk level of various narratives does not always correlate with their prevalence. Some less common narratives (for example, dehumanization of the opposition) demonstrate the highest level of risk, which may indicate their purposeful use in specific contexts.
The identified patterns allow not only better understanding the mechanisms of modern disinformation but also developing more effective counterstrategies.
Recommendations
Based on the conducted analysis, the following recommendations for countering disinformation can be proposed:
The monitoring strategy should take into account the interconnectedness of narratives and focus on identifying combinations of the three main narratives (anti-elitism, global conspiracy, dehumanization) using the “big four” techniques. Special attention should be paid to periods around significant political events, starting monitoring 4-6 weeks before the event and continuing for several weeks after.
Media literacy educational programs should emphasize recognizing multiple narratives in one material and identifying the main manipulative techniques, especially concept substitution and emotional provocation. It is important to develop an understanding of how different narratives complement each other to create a complex manipulative impact.
Counter-narratives should be developed taking into account the identified patterns of confidence and emotional impact of disinformation. Countermeasures should be differentiated depending on the type of narrative and techniques used – from fact-checking to counter distortion of facts to emotionally stable messages to neutralize emotional provocation.
It is important to develop automated systems for detecting disinformation capable of identifying combinations of narratives and techniques, taking into account their temporal dynamics and contextual features. Such systems should consider not only the content of individual messages but also their interconnection within a broader information campaign.
In the end, effective countering of disinformation requires a comprehensive approach that takes into account the complex structure of modern disinformation campaigns, their multi-layered nature, and close connection with the current agenda. Only by understanding the disinformation ecosystem in all its complexity can effective mechanisms for protecting the information space be developed.
